
















Examination Number: B002848 
M.Sc. History and Theory of Psychology 




Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 2 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 3 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 
Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 1: The Basic Emotions of Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer .................. 11 
Chapter 2: Varieties of Classification at the End of the Nineteenth Century ........... 20 
Chapter 3: Scientific Psychology and Basic Emotions as Instincts ............................. 28 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 36 
References .............................................................................................................................. 39 
 
 





I would like to thank my supervisor Peter Lamont for his criticism, guidance and 
encouragement during the writing of this dissertation.  Thank you also to my brother 
Richard Tallach for his fantastic proof-reading.  Finally, huge thanks go to my lovely 
children, Alex, Matthew and Eva Kennedy for being very, very patient with their 




This is an historical study looking at the notion of basic emotions and emotions 
classifications as they were formulated throughout the late nineteenth century.  
Emotions have been, and are, classified into those viewed as basic and complex by 
philosophers and Psychologists, but this way of organising emotions has been 
criticised as not being useful to the understanding of emotion.  As a result, it has 
been argued by Solomon(2002)  that a historical examination of the concept  of basic 
emotions is required in order to contextualise the way in which it is now defined.  
This study shows how the concept of basic emotions, and the classifications which 
were based on it,  altered during the late nineteenth century from those which had a 
moral basis to those which were  defined by evolutionary and physiological notions 
of emotion.  Further, it shows that it was framed differently by theorists depending 
on how they viewed the mind and the methodology they advocated.  It argues that 
the basic emotions concept and the classifications which are based on it are 
constructed in particular ways at particular times and are subject to both academic 




I would argue that the notion of ‚basic emotions‛ is neither meaningless nor 
so straightforward as its critics and defenders respectively argue, but it is 
historical and culturally situated and serves very different purposes in 
different contexts, including different research contexts<It is a subject with a 
rich history, and it is not one that can be readily understood within the 
confines of a technical debate in the Psychological Review.‛    
       (Solomon, 2002, p. 124) 
 
The idea that emotions can and should be classified has pervaded philosophical 
conceptions of feeling for centuries (Solomon, 2002). Descartes, for example, 
considered the six primitive passions to be wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and 
sadness and many other taxonomies of emotions were produced throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (e.g. Browne, Hamilton and  Spencer cited in 
Bain, 1865; McCosh, 1880; Ladd, 1893). This notion of classification has also been 
embraced by many emotions theorists in Psychology as a way of imposing some 
structure on a psychological phenomenon which might otherwise prove theoretically 
unmanageable (e.g. McDougall, 1910; Izard, 1977; Panskepp, 1982; Ekman et al., 1982; 
Frijda, 1986).  Classifications of emotions then provide frameworks in which the 
breadth of human emotional experience can be fitted, and explanations as to how 
emotions may be related to each other.  Definitions of the basic emotion concept are 
often the basis for classifications; a way of separating out those which are primary 
and those which are secondary in terms of particular attributes (Ortony and Turner, 
1990; Solomon, 2002; Prinz, 2004).  The primary emotions vary but are generally seen 
as simple and psychologically or biologically indivisible and in various combinations 
together make up the secondary emotions;  for example,  ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ together 
making ‘jealousy’.  
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Ortony and Turner (1990) list the basic emotions produced by various psychologists 
over the twentieth century for comparison.  These include some such as ‘anger’ and 
‘fear’ upon which most theorists appear to agree.  However, the lists also display as 
much variation as they do commonality. For example, ‘wonder’ appears only in the 
lists of McDougall and Frijda; ‘expectancy’ in Panskepp’s; and ‘contempt’ only in 
those of Izard and Tomkins. The differences between these lists, it may be argued, 
simply reflect differences in theoretical and methodological approaches and are 
nothing more than the ‚<healthy dialectic of a discipline trying to reconcile differing 
points of view‛ (Solomon, 2002, p.123).  This may well be the case. Nevertheless, 
current theories and methodologies are influenced by wider concerns, both by 
present assumptions about how the mind and emotions should be studied and 
understood and also by past conceptualisations of basic emotions which are taken up 
by researchers and used in particular ways at different times.   The variability in the 
lists then reflects more than a process of refinement and progress through debate; it 
also reflects the effect of context, both cultural and historical. 
 
Current theories of basic emotions are dominated by the view of psychological 
primitiveness as being tied to biological primitiveness (Ortony and Turner, 1990 1 ; 
Griffiths, 2003; Prinz, 2004; Izard, 2007). This view is based on two tenets. First, that 
basic emotions are those which can be shown to be innate, hard-wired and universal 
and for which neuro-biological and cross-cultural studies can provide evidence 
(Ekman, 1992). Ekman’s work, although criticised as being methodologically flawed 
by Solomon( 2002), shows that there may be universal facial expressions associated 
with particular emotions, for instance, smiling with happiness and frowning with 
anger.  Secondly, the connected argument is that basic emotions are those which are 
adaptive in evolutionary terms, are required for the survival of the species, and often 
correspond to those present in other vertebrates (Ekman, 1992; Griffiths, 2003; 
                                                          
 
1
 Ortony and Turner(1990) set out three definitions of basic emotions but state that these are not 
mutually exclusive: that concerning basic-level emotions words according to Rosch’s theory,  
psychological primitiveness and biological primitiveness. 
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Panskepp, 2004; Prinz, 2004). Fear, for example, is seen as response to danger which 
prepares us to fight or run and ensures that we respond to a threat.  It is therefore an 
adapted physiological response which promotes survival (Prinz, 2004). 
 
Despite the acceptance by most theorists of the above view, the continuing lack of 
consensus in lists of basic emotions has led certain psychologists and philosophers 
to question the usefulness of this concept and to call either for its abandonment 
(Ortony and Turner, 1990; Sander et al., 2007) or for the redefinition of what is 
essentially a materialistic view to incorporate cultural influences (e.g. Solomon, 2002; 
Prinz, 2004). However, the biological-evolutionary conceptualisation appears to 
become ever more entrenched as the discipline of affective neuroscience is currently 
viewed by many theorists as providing the most likely methodological paradigm in 
Psychology from which the evidence for basic emotions will emerge (e.g. Panskepp, 
1992; Davidson, 2003; Izard, 2007).  This paradigm continues then to inform lists of 
classifications of emotions and basic emotions as it is taken up and used by 
successive theorists using different methodological approaches as they seek to move 
towards greater refinement (Tomkins, 1984; Panskepp, 1992; Izard, 2007).  But as 
science makes progress as much away from past theories as it does towards final 
solutions (Kuhn cited in Hacking, 2001) so also do the definitions of its concepts 
emerge from previous definitions.  As Solomon’s statement at the beginning of the 
chapter shows, there is a need for an examination of the history of the basic emotions 
concept in order that a deeper understanding of its current meaning is reached and 
through which current research can be better understood and contextualised.  
 
This need is for two particular reasons. First, because past contexts within which 
meanings of the concept were established and evolved are relevant to how it is now 
used. Foucault (2010)2 states in Archaeology of Knowledge, ‚The history of a concept is 
                                                          
 
2
 Archaeology of Knowledge was first published in 1969 
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not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing 
rationality, its abstraction gradient...but successive rules of use and the theoretical 
contexts in which it developed and matured.‛ (p.5). Historical evidence can provide 
what Foucault calls the ‚genealogy‛ of a concept (Foucault, 1980, p.140),  from which 
the contemporary use of a term has emerged. It can do so by showing past usages 
and debates over use which are a part of current conceptualisations but knowledge 
of which has been forgotten over time. As Danziger (1982) says, ‚scientific 
development cannot take off from a theoretical vacuum but must make use of the 
conceptual equipment bequeathed to it‛ (p.142). An understanding of past usages   
are  relevant to an understanding of the present use. A second reason why there is a 
need for an examination of the history of basic emotions is because, psychological 
knowledge is constructed by taking particular forms at particular times, as the 
concepts it uses are shaped by the thoughts and actions of theorists (Lamont, 2010). 
An examination of the history of the classification of emotions and of the definition 
of basic emotions, can reveal how these classifications and definitions have changed 
over time; that they are not independent of the ontological position of the researcher 
or their methodological approach, and that further, they are not independent of the 
historical context in which they are conceived.  Therefore,  although claims are made 
by some contemporary theorists that basic emotions are ‘natural kinds’ (Izard, 2007), 
their history can reveal that often a particular theorist’s assumptions, sometimes tied 
to the social norms of time and place, has a profound effect on the way in which they 
are studied and understood. 
 
Solomon (2002) argues that the latter half of the nineteenth century was particularly 
important for the basic emotions concept, because there was an alteration during that 
period from a metaphysical understanding, of those emotions required for a 
complete life, towards the physicalist, one which more closely resembles the current 
definition. Dixon (2003) also suggests that the nineteenth century was a time of 
transformation in academic views of the role of affect in people’s lives and that 
during that time the term ‘emotion’ came to be used almost exclusively to denote the 
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previously used religious terms ‘affections’, ‘sentiments’ and ‘passions’. He further 
argues that, unburdened by theological meaning, the term ‘emotion’ was used to 
provide a scientific conceptualisation of feeling, and that the emotions theories which 
came to the fore at this time, were influenced particularly by biological and 
evolutionary views.  
 
Physiological descriptions became valued for their ability to explain the workings of 
the body and mental phenomena and philosophers, such as Herbert Spencer  and 
Alexander Bain, were beginning to understand emotions in those terms. 
Evolutionary explanations profoundly altered views of humanity and were 
eventually to pervade all aspects of psychological knowledge as theories about the 
mind became linked with ideas of adaptation to the environment, survival and 
relation to other species (Richards, 2002) and in terms of its place in nature 
(Danziger, 1982).  Further, the methodological debates at the time concerned what 
could or should constitute the inchoate discipline of scientific Psychology; whether, 
for example, the observation of the physiological aspects of an emotion were all that 
was required to capture and describe an emotion scientifically or whether 
introspection should or could be used to empirically examine the contents of 
consciousness (Danziger, 1994).   
 
By examining the theories prevalent during the late nineteenth century, this study 
attempts to expand on Solomon’s(2002) description of the emergence of a 
reductionist view of basic emotions which, he says, is that which continues to be the 
basis for current psychological theorising.  Dixon (2003) has shown that the debates 
throughout this time  have much to reveal about the ways in which the 
understanding of emotions is affected by particular views of the mind and methods 
of study. This study will build on his work by looking at the effect of these on the 
basic emotions concept and on classifications.  This study will examine the various 
ways in which these were formulated during this period and in so doing will address 
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three related issues : first,  the extent to which the definition of  the concept of basic 
emotions was influenced by particular theorists’ ontological views of the mind; 
secondly,  how the methodological approaches theorists advocated affected the way 
in which they classified emotions and thirdly, the extent to which classifications of 
emotions altered during this time in relation to the changing conceptualisations of 





This is an historical investigation using predominantly primary but also secondary 
sources.  Starting from the application of evolutionary theories to emotion by 
Spencer in The Principles of Psychology in 1855 up to the definition of basic emotions 
as connected to evolutionary instincts by, the influential English psychologist, 
William McDougall in 1910 in An Introduction to Social Psychology 3, a systematic 
analysis of the emotions literature from Britain and the U.S.A. will be conducted. 
These texts have been chosen as the beginning and ending points of the study 
because, as has been stated, the late nineteenth century was a time of particular 
change in the understanding of emotions and these are both important contributions 
to emotions research by prominent theorists at that time.  Spencer’s work is 
particularly significant in that it is the first to address the issue of emotions in terms 
of evolutionary adaptation (Young, 1990).  A large body of literature was produced 
on the subject of emotions during this period by philosophers, physiologists and 
psychologists in Britain and the U.S.A4. There are some theorists who were 
particularly celebrated at this time, and who are considered as being of the greatest 
                                                          
 
3
An Introduction to Social Psychology was first published in 1908.  For the purposes of this study the 
3rd edition(1910) has been used but is not significantly different from the first.  Twenty-three editions 
of  An Introduction to Social Psychology were published in the U.S.A. between 1908 and 1936. 
4
 At this time there was much work done also on emotions and classifications of emotions by theorists 
in France and Germany. Some of these are described in Bain, 1865. 
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influence on the emotions literature.  The works of Spencer (1855), Bain (1859), 
Charles Darwin (1872),  William James (1890) and McDougall (1910), for example, 
were widely read and highly persuasive. However, this study will also include the 
ideas of those who were not so prominent, such as James McCosh (1880), G.T. Ladd 
(1893) and Charles Mercier (1884a; 1884b;1885). These latter three, according to Dixon 
(2003), were instrumental in producing comprehensive theories and classifications of 
emotions but are rarely mentioned in histories of Psychology. This period was one 
during which several Psychology journals were founded, a reflection of the 
increasing importance of discussion about psychological matters at the time . The 
dates on which they were founded are shown in brackets: Mind (1876); the American 
Journal of Psychology (1887); the Psychological Review (1894); and the Psychological 
Bulletin (1904). The articles relating to emotion in these are examined and discussed if 
relevant.  
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Chapter 1: The Basic Emotions of Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer 
 
< two emotions, simple and near akin in their roots, may not only have 
grown unalike, but may also have grown involved in their natures though 
seeming homogenous to consciousness.  And here, indeed, in the inability of 
existing science to answer these questions which underlie a true 
psychological classification, we see how purely provisional any system of 
classification is likely to be. (Spencer, 1868, p.250)  
 
The mid-nineteenth century was a period of enormous change in the understanding 
of human behaviour because of the emergence of new ontological views of the mind 
and methodologies for its study (Dixon, 2003;  Richards, 2002).  Both had profound 
effects on how basic emotions were defined and classified.  In his comparison of  
philosophical and psychological classifications  of emotions, Solomon (2002) shows 
that prior to this time basic emotions had been understood as being those that had a 
moral role in the lives of people. They were those emotions closely connected with 
character, viewed to be of greater value than others if people were to live fulfilling 
lives.  As science became increasingly used to explain human behaviour during this 
time, physical rather than metaphysical understandings of the body and mind were 
becoming increasingly important (Dixon, 2003). Further, from the early nineteenth 
century philosophers such as Thomas Browne and J.S. Mill had been framing the 
operation of the human mind using the metaphor of ‘mental chemistry’ and so, like 
other structures in nature, it too was beginning to be understood as a collection of 
simple elements which, when interacting together, would produce more compound 
and complex psychological phenomena (Dixon, 2003; Boakes, 1984).  
Methodologically, as well as physiological investigations of the body, the use of the 
natural history method;  the systematic gathering of data about the natural world, 
was also attempting to define human beings in terms of their place in nature.  
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These new ways of looking at the mind were altering how emotions were defined 
and studied, as physiological views were challenging metaphysical and religious 
concepts(Dixon, 2003).  Two of the main proponents of these scientific approaches 
were Alexander Bain, a Scottish philosopher and physiologist, and Herbert Spencer, 
a philosopher and biologist.  Both were, what Richards(1996) calls, ‚pioneer 
psychologists‛ (p. 16) . This chapter will look at the debate between these two 
theorists to show how their approaches produced different constructions of basic 
emotions and of classifications.  First, it will describe how they differed in terms of 
how they understood the mind and in so doing produced different understandings, 
and descriptions, of basic emotions.  Further, it will examine the methods they 
advocated in producing classifications and at how these were tied to the academic 
and social assumptions of the time  Finally, it will compare Spencer’s and Bain’s 
classifications to show how these were shaped by their understandings of basic 
emotions and the methods they advocated.  
 
Alexander Bain was a Scottish philosopher and physiologist whose approach was to 
classify and describe psychological phenomena(Richards, 2002) by producing a 
systematic exposition of the physiology of the nervous system and the mind allied 
with the ideas of associationist philosophy 5(Dixon, 2003).   In The Emotions and the 
Will, Bain (1859) 6 describes the emotions using a mixture of physiological, 
psychological and philosophical thought, and, despite his basic, or special emotions, 
being described in terms of physiological reactions, the list of emotions he bases on 
those, he views as having ‚<a certain unity and distinctness as respects their origin 
in the human constitution‛ (Bain, 1865, p.39). They are those therefore which can be 
clearly demarcated in terms of their effect on the body and the circumstances in 
which they arise.  Bain’s(1859) basic, or special, emotions then are the law of 
                                                          
 
5
 Associationist philosophy is the view that the mind was composed of elements, or ideas 
organised by various associations 
6
 Three further editions of The Emotions and the Will were published in 1865, 1875 and 1899  and will 
also be referred to throughout this chapter. 
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harmony and conflict; the law of relativity, e.g. wonder and curiosity; terror; tender 
affections; emotions of self; power; the irascible emotion or anger; emotions of action; 
the exercise of the intellect.  These are the classes of emotions, which he, having 
reflected upon the range and variety of human affect, observes in himself and others 
as being most distinct and which best describe the most significant modes of feeling.  
 
The descriptions of individual emotions are distinctly physiological.  Thus, ‘terror’ is 
described as ‚<the cerebral force that was circulating at an ordinary pace through 
the usual channels...suddenly stimulated to an unusual discharge, withdrawn from 
these usual paths and vented at once upon the features, the gestures, the utterance 
and on the spasmodic utterance of volition‛(p.76).  The related physical and 
expressional accompaniments to this ‘diffusion’ are also detailed; for example, 
‚derangement of secretions‛, and ‚trembling of the lips and the muscles on the sides 
of the cheek‛(p.77),  However, the psychological character too is described as ‚<a 
massive and virulent state of misery‛(p.78).  These conceptions are in line with much 
scientific study at the time which had the purpose of providing systematic and 
detailed descriptions of natural phenomena (Bain, 1859). 
 
 In contrast Spencer’s 1855 Principles of Psychology takes a very different, and, at the 
time, radical view of the mind.  In it he was the first to ally associationist ideas about 
the mind with the application of evolutionary principles of observation of the natural 
world and adaptation to the environment (Young, 1990). Emotions are described as 
being on a continuum from those that are primitive and simple to those that are 
complex and intellect based.  The language he uses to describe the basic emotions 
then relate to emotions as experienced in animals or,  what he terms, ‘savages’.  Fear 
is described as: 
<nothing else than an impulse, an emotion, a feeling, a desire. To have in a 
slight degree those psychical states accompanying the reception of wounds, 
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those which express themselves in cries, those which are experienced during 
flight, is to be in a state of what we call fear. (Spencer, 1855, p.356) 
He also connects basic emotions with ideas of innateness as biologically pre-
programmed and present in human minds when they enter the world and as having 
a physiological response which is driven by instinct.  Emotions are described in 
terms of their purpose. Generational entrenchment of emotional response, both 
psychological and physical, happens in relation to repeated exposure to the same 
environmental events.  He gives the example related to hunting: 
If, along with the running down and laying hold of certain prey, there has 
always been experienced a certain scent; then, the presentation of that scent 
will render nascent the motor changes and impressions that accompany the 
running down and laying hold of the prey. (p.358) 
 
The descriptions of fear, as shown above, then differ substantially between the two 
theorists based on the particular understandings of the mind and emotion they 
advocate.  Indeed in the second edition of The Emotions and the Will, Bain (1865) 
states: 
 On the subject of Fear, I mentioned a suggestion of Mr. Spencer’s derived 
from the doctrine of evolution; far greater in my opinion, is the light flowing 
from the physical workings of that passion.  Those great physical generalities 
stated<are full of suggestions as to the mental laws.  (p. 603) 
For his part, Spencer praises Bain’s physiological and phenomenological descriptions 
of emotion but sees nothing in them to be used as a basis for classification.  He has 
set out a new ontological foundation on which the knowledge about the basic 
emotions can be framed, referring to Bain’s work as ‚transitional‛ (1868 7, p. 244).  
                                                          
 
7
 Spencer publishes an essay on   The Emotions and the Will in The Medico-Chirurgical Review in 
January, 1860.  It comes out in book form alongside essays on other topics in Essays Scientific, 
Political and Speculative(vol.1) in 1868. 
 15 
His use of that word is telling as it points to the nature of scientific knowledge, at 
how it alters over time and is dependent on the context and time in which it is 
produced.  In relation to the mind this is particularly salient, because of its 
complexity, its intangibility and of the many ways of understanding and framing it 
and, therefore, the choices that must be made about what are the most valuable ways 
of explaining mental phenomena.  These choices also are subject to context and time. 
Bain’s formulation of the basic emotions could be said to be transitional in that it is 
clear that there is still much to discover about the physiology of the body.  Spencer, 
however, is going further in suggesting that Bain’s understanding of emotions 
although useful has been overtaken by a new understanding, based on evolutionary 
ideas; that the concept of basic emotions would be more usefully constructed in a 
way which reflects these ideas.  The definition of the concept then is in transition 
during the debates between these theorists, each formulating it according to their 
own views. This is further highlighted by Bain’s and Spencer’s advocacy of 
alternative methods of study. 
 
As well as combining various views of emotions in his descriptions, Bain also 
combine’s two methods in the production of his classification. First, he states that he 
is using the natural history method that has been used in the hard sciences of botany 
and zoology and gives examples of its usefulness in cataloguing and dividing 
animals and plants into genera and species.  In using this method to classify 
emotions there is an assumption by Bain that non-physical objects like emotions are 
characteristically distinct, and that these characteristics can be scrutinised and used 
to categorise them in some way, despite the fact that they cannot be observed like the 
physical elements of the natural world.  Further, this method provides a way of 
framing emotions in a way which allows them, like elements in the periodic table, to 
be discovered and classified systematically in relation to other emotions.  This has 
two consequences. First, discovery rather than understanding of emotions becomes 
the focus, and secondly, their complexity is lost as they are viewed with regard to 
particular criteria in order to fit the classification.    
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Bain’s other method is that of introspection, used for generations by philosophers to 
study the mind and emotional states. In The Emotions and the Will he describes the 
value of introspection to the understanding of emotion:  
Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only medium of knowledge to 
the mental philosopher must therefore be still referred to as the principal 
means of discriminating the varieties of human feeling. We have the power of 
noting agreement and difference among our conscious states, and on this can 
raise a structure of classification.   
       (Bain, 1859, p. 57) 
Spencer (1868) is critical of the process by which Bain observes the emotions in order 
to classify them.  He says ‚ <Mr Bain in confining himself to an account of the 
emotions as they exist in an adult civilised man has neglected those classes of facts 
out of which the science of the matter must chiefly be built.‛(p 257).  Bain’s 
introspective method is seen by Spencer as constructing a particular version of the 
emotions that is exclusive to the mind of people in one sphere of society.  However, 
whilst Spencer criticises Bain for describing the emotions of a particular class of 
person, the method he advocates for their study is rooted in the assumed position of 
that very class.  Evidence of the more primitive emotions, he says, will be found in 
studying the behaviour of ‘savages’.  He states that: 
<we may note the emotional differences between the lower and higher 
human races – may regard as earlier and simpler those feelings which are 
common to both, and as later and more compound those which are 
characteristics of the most civilized. (Spencer, 1868, p. 250)  
That a hierarchy of intellectual and emotional states exist, running from the simple to 
the complex and represented by the social hierarchy running from animals, 
‘savages’, the mentally ill, children, women, men, to civilized intellectual European 
men, is an assumption prevalent at the time (Richards, 2002).  It is one which was 
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particularly stated in the work of Spencer and in Darwin’s (1872) Expressions of 
Emotions in Man and Animals, a work which has been greatly influential on the 
understanding of emotions as universal, cross-species and cross-cultural behavioural 
phenomena. This assumption, at the time, of different levels of species and human 
development fitted in very well with the evolutionary idea of the mind as an entity 
which gradually evolves in response to environmental influences and informed these 
theorists’ suggestions that the emotions should be studied by comparing species and 
races.  Indeed, Darwin (1872) conducted such observational work on the emotions of 
‘savages’ by sending out questionnaires to missionaries in order that they might 
gather information for him on the people they worked with.  He did so with the 
purpose of examining the universality of emotional expression in order to have a 
better understanding of  the emotions of those he viewed as civilized. 
 
The knowledge which was produced at this time about emotions then reflected these 
ideas of social superiority. Spencer (1868), for example, says: 
There are æsthetic emotions common among ourselves, that are scarcely in 
any degree experienced by some inferior races; as, for instance, those 
produced by music. (p. 131) 
This is an example of the way in which psychological knowledge often unwittingly 
incorporates the social norms of the day.  Assumptions like these may not be 
explicitly stated in current psychological research, however ideas about the mental 
lives of other races in relation to Western psychological theorising are still salient.  
Psychological work is always conducted from the thought process of a researcher 
who is situated in a particular place and time and who views those they are studying 
from a mind which contains experiences, assumptions and values that are shaped in 
particular ways (Richards, 2002).  The understanding which is produced therefore, if 
these assumptions are not examined or expressed, is in danger of being, not simply 
influenced by them, but of containing and reiterating these social biases.  
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Spencer and Bain, therefore, approach the examination of emotions with different 
questions in mind.  Spencer’s method is looking to answer the questions, ‘Which 
emotions serve in the survival of the species and what purpose do they serve?’.  Bain, 
on the other hand is asking, ‘How are individual emotions experienced and which 
ones are easily demarcated through the feeling they produce?’.  The knowledge 
about the basic emotions that Bain and Spencer produce therefore is bound to differ. 
Unlike Bain, Spencer did not put his method into practice in producing a detailed 
classification.  However he does propose one which he sees as ‚in harmony with the 
results of detailed analysis aided by development‛(1868, p.142) He divides the 
feelings into presentative feelings, or sensations; presentative-representative feelings, 
or emotions which arise in response to an immediate event; representative feelings, 
which are brought about by thinking of an emotion; and re-representative feelings, 
or emotions which are produced by thinking about events.  His classification 
represents the idea of increasing abstraction and complexity of the emotional state.   
 
Bain’s(1865) classification, as has been stated, is based on his own consciousness, and 
the phenomenological divisions he finds in his own emotional life.   He, however, in 
responding to Spencer’s criticisms, states that: 
It appears therefore, that I have given a classification as nearly agreeing with 
Mr Spencer’s, as two independent minds can be expected to agree in so vast a 
subject;  (1865, p.605) 
The vagueness of Spencer’s classification perhaps accounts for some of the ease of 
the agreement noted by Bain.  The structures of these classifications and the way in 
which emotions are understood within these classifications, however, are very 
different.   Indeed Bain largely resists entertaining the evolutionary hypothesis in 
subsequent editions of The Emotions and the Will(1865; 1875; 1899) and adheres to 
almost the same classification as he proposed in the first edition, whilst looking at the 
question of evolution in a separate chapter conceding: 
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< I have fully discussed the bearing of the Evolution hypothesis on the 
Emotions.  The only question here considered is – Do the facts, when viewed 
in the light of this hypothesis, gain in clearness?  As regards, more especially, 
the great antagonistic couple Love and Anger – I think the effect is happy. 
(Bain, 1875, p. viii) 
Bain does not fully embrace the evolutionary hypothesis with regard to his 
classification. It cannot easily be incorporated into an existing theory which has been 
constructed under very different assumptions regarding the study of the mind.  It is 
clear, however, that if it is to be embraced by psychologists as the view of how 
emotion should be understood and studied it will always provide a particular, not 
necessarily the only, definition of basic emotions and basis for classification. 
 
The debate between Bain and Spencer then illustrates the irreconcilability of the 
variations in the basic emotions concept and in the classifications of emotions.  For 
Bain the basic emotions are to be demarcated using introspection and classified using 
the natural history method; for Spencer, the evolutionary hypothesis is used to 
separate out emotions in terms of their developmental aspects and comparative 
psychology used to study them.  These theorists therefore construct the idea of the 
basic emotions and their classifications in relation to their own understandings and 
assumptions about the most salient aspects of human emotional states, and further, 
in relation to certain social and academic assumptions of the time.  
 20 
Chapter  2:  Varieties of Classification at the End of the Nineteenth Century 
 
If then we should seek to break the emotions, thus enumerated, into groups 
according to their affinities, it is again plain that all sorts of groupings would 
be possible according as we chose one character or that as a basis, and that all 
the groupings would be equally real and true. The only question would be, 
does this grouping or that, suit our purpose best? (James, 1890, p. 485)  
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the scientific study of the mind 
was no longer in its infancy, the variety of ways in which science could be applied to 
mental phenomena in the production of theories was becoming clear.  The 
dependency of these theories on different ontological stances and methodological 
approaches, meant that for the inscrutable subject of human emotions, in contrast to 
bodily functions, scientific consensus was proving difficult (Dixon, 2003).  The work 
of Spencer, Bain and Darwin, however, was not simply influencing current theory 
but was becoming more entrenched as their ideas were built on by, for example, 
William James (1884; 1890; 1892) and George Trumbull Ladd (1893),  two of the most 
prominent U.S. psychologists at the time.  However, they were also explicitly resisted 
by those such as  James McCosh(1880), a philosopher of the Scottish Common Sense 
School and president of Princeton College (later University), New Jersey, who 
objected to purely physiological descriptions of the mind (Dixon, 2003).  This time is 
one which is particularly revealing about the classification of emotions because of the 
variety of approaches taken.  This chapter will illustrate this variety by, first, 
focusing on the challenge to materialistic accounts of emotion that was taking place, 
taking the work of James McCosh (1880) as an example and then by contrasting the 
emotions classifications of McCosh, and Charles Mercier, whose work was based on 
evolutionary ideas.  Finally,  and most importantly, it will show that at this time 
there was a realisation by theorists, such as James Sully (1892), Ladd (1893) and 
James (1890), of the subjective nature of classifications. The reasons for this 
realisation will be examined, as will its implication for the psychological study of 
emotions. 
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As Dixon (2003) shows there was much resistance towards the views of the mind that 
had an evolutionary or purely physiological basis at this time from theorists who 
objected to materialist accounts of psychological phenomena. This was for two 
particular reasons. First, because they were concerned that the concept of the mind, 
or soul, as entities separate from the body would be lost if human behaviour was to 
be explained purely in terms of the nervous system. Secondly, there was a fear that 
the idea of humans as possessing a will which allowed them to control their 
behaviour was being eroded by theories of emotions as inherited instincts to respond 
and act in relation to particular events.   One of those who adhered to these views 
was James McCosh8 who published The Emotions in 1880.  In it he states: 
I wish to <treat chiefly of the mental, which is indeed the main, the essential 
element. The grand defect of the account given of the emotions in the present 
day by the physiological psychologist is that they dwell exclusively on the 
organic affections and leave upon us the impression that these constitute the 
feelings, and have over looked the more important characteristics of our 
nature. (p. 113)  
McCosh’s view of an emotion is one which, like Bain’s, has physical, 
phenomenological and mental features, and is structured in a theory which includes 
four mains aspects: the appetence, or the tendency to avoid pain and be drawn to 
pleasure; the idea of something from which the emotion is formed; the conscious 
feeling; and finally, the organic affection in the brain and body.  It is one in which 
emotions are to some extent under the control of the intellect and the will.  In the 
conclusion to The Emotions he states that emotions ‚<are to be guided on the one 
had by our intelligence, which tells us what things are, and on the other hand by our 
conscience, which tells announces what things ought to be.‛ (p. 251)  
 
                                                          
 
8
 Ruckmick(1934) remarks on the value of  McCosh’s theory of emotions, and his surprise at its 
neglect by U.S. Psychologists of the time. Also, Davis(1936), in reviewing the history of U.S. 
Psychology of the nineteenth century remarks that, ‘The Emotions displays original treatment of a topic 
almost neglected by preceding American theorists.’(p.484). 
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In McCosh’s(1880) account then emotions are not purely physiological reactions 
guided by evolutionary heredity but are subservient to the agency of a human being 
with a will that can override the actions that they may prompt.  This is an attempt to 
explain the emotions based on a more complete, anti-reductionist, view of the 
emotional lives of people with more than the sorts of aspects that it seemed that 
science could tackle at the time.  An understanding then of how the emotions 
operate, not simply according to science but in the lives of people, is reflected in 
McCosh’s choice as the basis of his classification.  He choose the classification of 
Scottish philosopher, Thomas Brown (cited in Bain, 1865), produced during the time 
previous to when physiological and evolutionary understandings of the mind were 
valued in academia. 
 
McCosh(1880) divides emotions into time categories of retrospective, immediate and 
prospective. But within these those which represent the pain and pleasure of life are 
classified: self-satisfaction and its, opposite, regret; joy and sorrow; pride and self-
humiliation, for example.  For him emotions have a valence of positivity or 
negativity as they are felt and understood.  His classification is an expression of the 
experience of people’s emotions as they move through life, and reflect on events, 
whether of the present, past or future.  The nature of emotional life in McCosh’s 
theory then is neither a series of physiological responses nor of adaptations to the 
environment. It rather attempts to ground scientific definitions of emotion by 
connecting them to the ways in which people feel and handle their emotions.  In 
doing so it contrasts significantly with the ideas of Charles Mercier, as described 
below. 
 
At the end of nineteenth century a comprehensive and systematic scientific 
classification had still not been produced along the lines of the zoological and 
botanical taxonomies using the natural history method. Bain had dropped any 
mention of this method as informing his classification in later editions of The 
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Emotions and the Will (Bain 1875; Bain, 1899). However, in 1884 Charles Mercier, an 
English physician and writer, attempted such a comprehensive classification. 
Published in three parts in the journal Mind, it was produced in accordance with the 
principles of adaptation of emotions to the environment and their stimulation by 
various environmental events (Mercier, 1884a; Mercier, 1884b; Mercier, 1885).   He 
states that, ‚These are the interactions which primarily affect the conservation of the 
organism, and those which primarily affect the perpetuation of the race.‛ (p.336).  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this view that emotions can be classified 
comprehensively is particularly related to the evolutionary paradigm because of the 
description it provides of simple psychological phenomena developing into more 
complex phenomena through an organism’s, or species’, interaction with the 
environment. For Mercier, however, emotions are not classified as basic or more 
complex but are all treated similarly in accordance with the principle of 
environmental stimulus. 
 
Over the three articles in Mind, Mercier produces tables in which emotions are 
grouped according to their class, sub-class, order and genus.  For example, feelings 




CLASS I. Sub-class I. Order II. Genus 2: The Feelings of Repugnance 
 
The feeling 
corresponds with the 
relation to the 
organism of an agent 
which is passively 
noxious 
to the taste 
and moderately noxious disgust 
and intensely noxious loathing 
in other ways   
generally 
and not of superior power dislike 
and of superior power abhorrence 




        (Mercier, 1884, p. 510) 
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For Mercier then’ joy’  is of the genus ‘joyous feelings’ which corresponds to an agent 
which is cognized as beneficent; and ‘awe’ the genus ‘feelings of admiration’ as he 
continues in this vein to classify over one hundred emotions.  Mercier’s classification 
seems plausible to the extent that the feelings that he classifies do relate to separate 
emotional events which have particular words attached to them, and perhaps could 
be shown to be brought about through different environmental stimuli.  However, in 
tying together particular events and intensities of event there is an assumption made 
about the universal correlation of these events to the feelings in the table.   
 
 
Mercier’s and McCosh’s classifications show that due to the intangibility of human 
emotional states classification must be conducted, not based on physical properties, 
as those for plants and animals are, but indirectly through some other connected 
property, such as, in Mercier’s case, environmental impact, or in McCosh’s case, 
temporal aspects and the pain/pleasure valence. These bases define the emotion 
states in accordance with those properties producing classifications which provide a 
particular view.  Further, rather than depicting the ways in which emotions operate 
in reality, the process of theorising and classification produces an understanding of 
emotion which is reduced to particular aspects. Carveth Read (1886), the English 
philosopher, states that in looking at Mercier’s classification: 
 
<we might suppose that the forces of the environment only approach the 
organism in single file; that the organism deals with the environment by a 
series of uncoordinated movements; and that our feelings, just as distinct and 
structurally on a level, pair off with these interactions. But surely the conduct 
of life is not so easy, and we are not so simple-minded. (p. 78) 
 
The optimism of Bain and Spencer that emotions could be classified according to the 
natural history method, as if they are plants and animals, was shown to be 
unfounded as Mercier’s classification is met with admiration but also a realisation 
that it is an impossible task (e.g. Robertson, 1896).  
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These examples of the constructed nature of classifications lead on to the main point 
of this chapter, that there was a realisation by emotions theorists at the time that the 
classification of emotions was at best approximate and at worst wholly subjective. 
This was for two main reasons. First, it was related to the acknowledged difficulty of 
separating them into discrete objects for study. As James Sully (1892) writes in The 
Human Mind:   
 
<emotions are an eminently complex and variable phenomena.  Thus what 
we call a feeling of joy or grief will exhibit an infinite number of shades 
answering to particular modes of presentative consciousness and the 
particular currents of feeling to which these give rise.  No precise systematic 
arrangement can therefore be tried. (p. 83 )  
 
Secondly, it became understood that these classifications were being created as a tool 
for each theorist to make sense of their own work on emotions, rather than, as many 
of them hoped, a step on the road to a once-and–for all taxonomy, akin to the 
periodic table, from which the emotions already ‘discovered’ could be shown in 
some order or hierarchy and those that were to be discovered slotted in to their 
natural positions when found.   The quotation by James (1890) in The Principles of 
Psychology at the beginning of this chapter expresses the state of emotions 
classification at the time. Emotions, he says, were being classified in all sorts of ways, 
‚<natural or acquired, formal or material, sensuous or ideal, direct or reflective<‛  
( p.485).   It was clear, given the variety, that although there may be valid arguments 
and disagreements with regard to producing a better classification based on a 
particular criterion such as Mercier’s environmental stimulation, there was no self-




For philosophers this was not a problem because their work was understood as the 
production of an individual mind and a particular viewpoint.  For those following 
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the lines of scientific discovery with the hope of producing classifications which 
definitively represented the emotion states of human beings, this realisation 
highlighted the difficulty, if not impossibility, of their task.   So for psychologists this 
realisation posed a dilemma:  whether to continue to classify emotions, with a 
disclaimer regarding the difficulty, or whether to abandon attempts at classification 
altogether.  Contrasting examples of these approaches are provided by two of the 
most prominent psychologists in the United States at the time, George Trumbull 
Ladd(1893) and William James(1890).  The former, the founder of the Psychology 
laboratory at Yale University, states in relation to emotions, ‚<in the attempt to use 
these differences<for the purposes of classification, we are prevented in somewhat 
the same way as that in which we are prevented when attempting the classifications 
of sensations of smell.‛ (Ladd, 1893,  p.388).  He, however, continues in the same 
chapter to produce a classification of his own which illustrates another aspect of 
construction.  Divided into sensuous, aesthetic, intellectual and moral feelings, the 
emotions are organised by, he says, ‚<the natural organic variety in the activities of 
the mind.‛ (p. 389).  Ladd falls into the trap of considering the divisions common at 
the time, such as ‘moral’ and ‘aesthetic’, as being universal and intrinsic to human 
nature rather than historically and culturally situated.   
 
 
The culture of classification then caused even some of those who were sceptical 
about the possibility of classification to attempt to produce one, however flawed.   In 
contrast, however, James (1890) resists producing a classification.  Indeed he is 
reluctant to study individual emotions at all, citing his frustration at reading the 
wealth of physiological descriptions of particular emotions: 
 
<the merely descriptive literature of the emotions is one of the most tedious 
parts of psychology.  And not only is it tedious, but you feel that its 
subdivisions are to a great extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its 
pretences to accuracy are a sham. (p.448) 
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What James sees as required, rather than all these classifications and descriptions of 
individual emotions, is a scientific theory which will hold for all emotions regardless 
of their place in a hierarchy or taxonomy.  The theory which he produced relates to a 
particular understanding of emotion and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century there was a plethora of classifications produced 
by theorists who were coming from different ontological positions.  Materialistic and 
evolutionary accounts were being challenged by those which wished to produce 
theories of emotions which included the mind, the will and the intellect.  One of 
these was James McCosh (1880) whose classification was based on the premise that 
there was more to emotions than their physical components and who rejected 
evolutionary ideas as being applicable to the understanding of emotions.  In contrast, 
Charles Mercier’s (1884a; 1884b; 1885) classification embraced the idea of the 
development of emotions in relation to the environment but, despite its 
comprehensiveness, it still produces a picture which was unrepresentative of the 
way in which emotions are environmentally stimulated in reality.  The defects of 
classifications at this time caused theorists to suspect that they were provisional and 
subjective and served only the purposes of the theorists who produced them.  Some 
continued, despite this realisation, to produce classifications but James decided 
rather, to put his effort into producing a theory which would provide a 
comprehensive explanation for emotions.  
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Chapter 3: Scientific Psychology and Basic Emotions as Instincts 
 
In adapting to scientific use a word from popular culture, it is inevitable that 
some violence should be done to common usage; and, in adopting this rigid 
definition of emotion, we shall have to do such violence in refusing to admit 
joy, sorrow, and surprise (which are often regarded, even by writers on 
psychology as the very types of emotions) to our list whether of simple or 
primary emotions or of complex emotions. 
      (William McDougall, 1910, p. 48) 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century Psychology was establishing itself as a scientific 
discipline, particularly in Germany and in the United States (Richards, 2002; 
Danziger, 1994). Psychologists were defining, and starting to be defined by, the ways 
in which they approached the study of the mind. Physiological and evolutionary 
theories were elaborated on, and framed much of the psychological work which was 
conducted (Dixon, 2003).   Observation of physiological responses provided much of 
the data on emotion but there was a recognition also that human behaviour was not 
simply about physical reactions, and introspection was being used to examine 
thoughts and mental processes (Richards, 2002).    In the United States, Psychology 
departments and labs, the first at Johns Hopkins University in 1887, were being set 
up in universities, based on German examples (Danziger, 1994).    The increasing 
standing that scientific Psychology9 had as a discipline with the purpose of 
describing and explaining the mind and human behaviour during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries amplified the academic weight of the knowledge that it 
was producing.  For classifications of emotions and the definition of basic emotions 
then, the approaches taken by psychologists, both theoretically and methodologically 
became increasingly salient as the knowledge about them became regarded as 
scientific knowledge, evidence and proof.  The work of theorists such as Darwin and 
Spencer was built on as evolutionary theories had become established as one of the 
                                                          
 
9
 The term ‘scientific Psychology’ here is used to denote the emergence of the discipline through the 
setting up of Psychology laboratories and departments in universities. 
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main bases from which the mind should be viewed by psychologists (Dixon, 2003).  
In examining how the basic emotions were viewed at this time, this chapter will first 
discuss one of the overriding ontological themes of the time which became 
associated with emotion; that of the evolutionary concept of instinct.  It will show 
how the conceptualisations of instinct and emotion altered over time as they were 
taken up by particular theorists (Boakes, 1984; Richards, 1996), and then will examine 
how the understanding of emotions became increasingly tied to concepts of instinct, 
as shown in the work of American psychologist, William James (e.g. 1890) and 
English psychologist, William McDougall (1910) 10.  The effect of their views of 
instincts on their conceptualisations of basic emotions will also be described.  Finally, 
using  McDougall’s theory as an example, this chapter will go on to look at how 
intimately theory and methodology are linked in the construction process as each 
develop to complement the other in the production of knowledge about basic 
emotions. 
 
The concept of instincts changed throughout the nineteenth century (Richards, 2002).   
First, evolutionary theories changed the concept of instinct from that meaning 
something which had been placed in an animal by God to a behaviour which had 
been inherited for survival (Richards, 2002). Spencer was the first to use the latter 
view in relation to the motivation behind emotional response and during the late 
nineteenth century this view continued to be refined as it was used by different 
psychologists for theoretical purposes (James, 1890; McDougall, 1910).  Spencer’s 
conceptualisation of instinct was one of compound reflex action, based on one of the 
predominant physiological concepts of the time, the reflex (Danziger, 1997).  For 
James (1890), instinct was similarly defined. In the  Principles of Psychology he states 
‚The actions we call instinctive all conform to the general reflex type ; they are called forth 
by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal's body,  or at a distance in 
his environment‛ (p. 384).   This purely physiological explanation encompasses both 
                                                          
 
10
 William McDougall moved from Oxford to Harvard University in 1920 and was professor of 
Psychology there until 1927. 
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activities such as sucking, crying and smiling but also the emotional reactions.  
McDougall (1910) in contrast describes instincts, not simply in terms of physiological 
responses but also involving a cognitive element. 
<but instincts are more than innate tendencies or dispositions to certain 
kinds of movement.  There is every reason to believe that even the most 
purely instinctive action is the outcome of a distinctly mental process, one 
which is incapable of being described in purely mechanical terms, because it 
is a psycho-physical process, involving psychical as well as physical changes; 
that is to say, every instance of instinctive behaviour involves a knowing of 
some thing or object, a feeling in regard to it, and a striving towards or away 
from that object.  (p.26) 
 
This is a radically different view of the instinct concept of both Spencer and James, as 
the seat of the instinctual response moves from the body to the mind,  and reflects 
changing views of what Psychology should be.   James’s formulation in 1884 came at 
a time when there had been decades of the production and publication of 
physiological descriptions of human behaviour (James, 1890) and so the fact that 
theories of emotion produced at that time reflect this emphasis is not surprising. By 
1910 when the first edition of McDougall’s An Introduction to Social Psychology was 
published, developments around the formulation of the subject matter of Psychology 
had taken place (Danziger, 1994).  Stout (1903), in the Groundwork of Psychology 
describes the subject of Psychology as being psychical states and processes and the 
objects in the world which stimulate these.  Cognition, more than physical response, 
then, is a more predominant element of McDougall’s theorising.  Therefore, as the 
subject matter of Psychology altered, so too did the concept of instincts towards 
definitions which reflected distinct ways of framing human behaviour.  However, for 
both James and McDougall, because instincts were intimately tied to their theories of 
emotion, their conceptualisations of instinct were to inform, and to be formed 
similarly to, their ideas of basic emotions 
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This is shown in James’s seminal emotions theory, first published in Mind in 1884, 
which very much reflects his physiological conceptualisation of instinct.  For him 
‚Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions<shade imperceptibly into each 
other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well.‛  (James, 1890, 
p. 442 ). Emotion is an automatic physical response to something in the environment.  
Like the instinctiveness of a baby crying when its needs are not being met, for James 
an emotion is simply the unconscious organic response to a stimulus. Rather than 
crying because we are unhappy, or running because we understand that we are 
afraid, he says that there is no ‘mind-stuff’ that constitutes the emotion. Instead we 
are unhappy because we cry or we are afraid because we run away; the physical act 
and the feeling are the emotion.  For him the usefulness of physiological explanations 
of both instincts and emotions is that there is a possibility that a comprehensive 
theory to explain the behaviour associated with instinct and emotion can be 
provided; one which explains what happens within the body to cause both emotional 
and instinctual behaviour to occur.   
 
James describes the basic emotions, or ‘coarser emotions’ (James, 1890, p. 449) as 
those with a ‚strong organic reverberation‛ (p. 449), having pronounced physical 
sensations in the organs of the body.  Initially those of anger, fear, love and grief 
(James, 1890); he adds also joy, hate, shame and pride in a later book (James, 1892, 
p.468).  He makes the assumption that the  strength of reaction may be related to an 
innate, instinctual response which separates them from the ‘subtler emotions’ which 
he describes as  ‚the moral, intellectual and æsthetic feelings<‛ and which  
‚...borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from parts below the brain‛  
(James, 1890, p.468).   These subtler emotions are different entirely in nature from the 
basic emotions, being cerebral rather than physical.  So even though he resists 
producing a classification, his theory demands that he divides the emotions, because 
the theory cannot, after all, be universally applied to all emotional responses.   
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In McDougall’s work the correlation between instinct and basic emotion becomes 
even more robust and the emotions are separated out according to a different rule 
(McDougall, 1910).  He sees primary emotions as those related to the instincts in 
‚higher animals‛(p.49) which have an attached, strong accompanying emotional 
state.  For him there are seven distinct emotions related to instincts; those of fear, 
disgust, wonder, anger, subjection, elation and tender emotion.  Each is tied to a 
particular instinct: the instinct of flight with fear and the instinct of curiosity with the 
emotion of wonder, for example.   An odd omission in McDougall’s list of main 
instincts is the instinct of reproduction, which in evolutionary terms is clearly vital 
for survival and could be said to produce the emotions of desire or of love.   This is 
perhaps more reflective of the time at which McDougall was writing when there was 
a reluctance by theorists regarding tackling the subject of sex in the context of 
explaining human behaviour (Foucault,1998).  McDougall is clearly reluctant to go 
into details about this instinct stating that ‚It is unnecessary to dwell on this feature, 
since it has been dealt with exhaustively in many thousands of novels.‛(p. 82).  
Often, the internalisation of social and cultural values by psychologists affects what 
they omit, or include, in their work.  These may include the way in which society 
views particular aspects of human behaviour and accepted ways of talking about 
such aspects. Social values operate to shape psychological knowledge in more subtle 
ways than the, more explicit, influences of theory and methodology.  
 
Whilst their lists of basic emotions contain many of the same emotions, James (1890) 
and McDougall(1910), conceive the connection between instinct and emotion 
differently.  ‘Joy’ for James is a basic emotion because for him, whilst being 
intimately bound up in instinctive behaviour, emotion is defined by the strength of 
feeling.  For McDougall, on the other hand, ‘joy’ cannot be described by scientific 
Psychology as a basic emotion because it is not tied to a particular instinct, as evident 
in the behaviour of ‘higher animals’.  His primary emotions are those produced as 
part of instinctive acts which ensure the survival of human beings.  This is a view of 
instinct which James does not find useful: 
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A very common way of talking about these admirably definite tendencies to 
act is by naming abstractly the purpose they subserve, such as self-
preservation, or defense, or care for eggs and young -- <But this represents 
the animal as obeying abstractions which not once in a million cases is it 
possible it can have framed. The strict physiological way of interpreting the 
facts leads to far clearer results. (p. 383) 
Their alternative constructions of basic emotions then serve very different purposes, 
produce different kinds of understandings about the role that emotions play in the 
lives of people and provide different types of scientific knowledge about basic 
emotions.   Further, their different constructions depend on different kinds of 
evidence to show that a particular theory is valid.  The methodology they choose to 
provide evidence is then intimately bound up with their theories. 
 
McDougall, for example, bases his primary emotions on the theory that the instincts 
and connected primary emotions in humans are those displayed in the behaviour of 
animals.  This then, naturally, leads him to suggest, like Spencer (1868), that 
comparative psychology is the most valuable method for the discovery of these 
emotions:  
<if a similar emotion and impulse are clearly displayed in the instinctive 
activities of the higher animals, that fact will afford a strong presumption that 
the emotion and impulse in question are primary and simple; on the other 
hand if no such instinctive activity occurs among higher animals we must 
suspect the affective state in question of being either a complex composite 
emotion or no true emotion. (p.48) 
In relation to comparative psychology, Richards (2002) states that ‘<the use being 
made of animal behaviour evidence will determine the kind of theories being 
produced.’ (p.141). I would suggest also, that in the case of McDougall’s theory of 
instincts and emotions at least, the methodology is chosen to provide evidence for 
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the theory and that both support each other in his construction of his concept of basic 
emotions. 
 
McDougall’s advocacy of the study of animals is based on two assumptions inherent 
to comparative psychology which have been stated by Richards (2002): first, that 
animal and human behaviour are on a continuum and also that animal behaviour is 
simpler than human behaviour.   As regards the understanding of emotions then, the 
assumption that those, such as fear and anger,  observed in the behaviour of animals 
and which are experienced and given names by humans,  are the same mental 
phenomena is inherent in the work of comparative psychologists.  It may be, 
however, that because the emotions of animals are not mediated through language, 
their emotional experiences are phenomenologically and physically different from 
those of humans.  Further, there may be emotions which animals have which 
humans do not and psychologists, with their human minds and experiences, are 
unable to recognise as such.   In framing the basic emotions concept in terms of 
animal instincts, and their study through the use of comparative psychology, 
McDougall is constructing a view which carries these assumptions about the 
relationship between animals and people and the knowledge he produces may 
therefore be inherently flawed for the above reasons.  His basic emotions list, also, is 
predicated both on the theory that is used to define these basic emotions and on the 
methodology that is used to discover them, both of which support each other in the 
construction of, and perpetuation of, this particular view.   
 
This time in the history of scientific Psychology was one in which it was becoming 
established as a discipline in its own right, with distinct theoretical approaches and 
methodologies.  One prominent theme in the study of basic emotions at the time was 
the way in which they were tied to instinct, a concept which was, however, defined 
by theorists in different ways.  This was reflected in how the basic emotions concept 
was viewed by William James (1890) and William McDougall (1910).  The differences 
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between them in how they viewed the relationship between instinct and emotion 
meant that they produced different constructions of basic emotions.  James’s list 
reflected those emotions which could be said to be instinctual because they showed 
the greatest strength of feeling. For McDougall, human basic emotions were to be 
viewed in terms of those displayed in the instinctual behaviour of animals.  
Although the views of these theorists are similar in the way in which they 
understand emotions as being tied to instinct, their emphasis on different aspects of 









During the period between 1855 and 1910 the definition of basic emotions went 
through various revisions, adjustments and modifications as it was taken up by 
consecutive theorists.  From Bain and Spencer to James and McDougall, the concept 
changed from one which framed basic emotions as those important for living a 
fulfilling life(Solomon, 2002) and of a product of philosophic introspection, to one 
which was understood physiologically and in terms of the purpose of  adaptation to 
the environment.  The work of science in observing, scrutinising, and taking apart 
the mind to examine how it worked, in the process reduced the concept to one which 
described basic emotions which were fundamental in a biological sense, rather than a 
moral sense.   
 
 
This change however, is  in part a question of semantics; definitions of emotion 
words altering in the transition they make from being used in real life, to how they 
are described in philosophical and psychological theories, where constraints are 
artificially imposed on their meaning.   McDougall’s quote at the beginning of 
Chapter Three illustrates this nicely.  In taking any psychological object and 
subjecting it to the scrutiny of academic study, the meaning that the object has must 
be shaped in particular ways and understood in accordance with whatever 
understanding of the mind or methodology is used in its study.  The concept of basic 
emotions then has been constructed in particular ways by particular theorists in the 




Further,  methods and theories are tied to specific historical and academic contexts 
and eras, producing knowledge that is composed of both academic and social 
assumptions about the mind and emotions at particular times.  The thoughts of those 
producing psychological knowledge affect how concepts are framed and studied.  In 
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relation to the hidden  and abstract world of feeling and emotion,  the experiences of 
researchers was, and is, influential in how they themselves understand and construct 
the idea of basic emotions and classification. As this quote from William 
McDougall(1910), rather wittily, illustrates  in relation to  ‘tender emotion’: 
This primary emotion has been very generally ignored by the philosophers 
and psychologists; that is, perhaps, to be explained by the fact that this 
instinct and its emotion are in the main decidedly weaker in men than in 
women, and in some men, perhaps, altogether lacking. We may even surmise 
that the philosophers as a class are men among whom this defect of native 
endowment is relatively common. (p. 56) 
 
 
For classifications of emotions the lists produced by theorists were constructed in 
particular ways for particular reasons.  Dixon(2003) asserts that, although lists of 
emotions produced at the beginning and end of the nineteenth century might contain 
the same items, the understanding of the person on which they were based had 
altered.  In comparing the emotions produced by Bain(1859) and those by 
McDougall(1910) it can be seen that despite their very different approaches they 
agree on six emotions; fear, wonder, the two emotions of self, anger and tender 
emotion.  However, the emotion of ‘disgust, ’in McDougall’s is absent from Bain’s 
list. Not because disgust did not exist in 1859 but because McDougall’s classification 
was based on which emotions were particularly visible in animals and Bain’s on 
which emotions could be distinctly observed within him and which had a connected 
clear bodily response. Bain’s list contains several, however, that McDougall’s 
formulation would not allow for; emotions of the intellect, for example.   
 
 
It may be that alternative views of emotions will produce lists of basic emotions that 
remain roughly the same and perhaps this is in part to do with the social ubiquity of 
particular emotions which could certainly be predicated on an innate, predisposition 
or a strong physiological response.   However, what an understanding of the 
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construction of the basic emotions concept, as revealed through historical 
examination, provides us with is a freedom from the constraint of thinking of it only 
in those terms and a freedom also to conclude that there may be other ways of 
defining the notion of what ‘basic’ might mean to people’s emotional lives. As 
Solomon(2002) argues, basic emotions could alternatively and more usefully be 
understood as those basic to societies, those most fundamental to their functioning.  
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